Constructing Homeland Security Knowledge Graphs by Koulas, Emmanouil










SCHOOL OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY 
A thesis submitted for the degree of  
























SCHOOL OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY 
A thesis submitted for the degree of  
Master of Science (MSc) in Data Science 
 
APRIL 2021 
THESSALONIKI – GREECE 
  -iii- 
 
Abstract 
This dissertation was written as a part of the MSc in Data Science at the International 
Hellenic University. This project is placed on the intersection of traditional security 
domains, like homeland security, and technology. The importance of incorporating new 
technologies to address traditional threat to security is almost self-evident. 
 In this dissertation I construct two knowledge graphs related to terrorism, using the 
RAND Database of WorldWide Terrorism Incidents (RANDWTI) and the Global Ter-
rorism Database (GTD). Utilizing Neo4J’s software to construct the graphs, I highlight 
some use cases in which the very existence of those graphs can provide valuable insight 
to policy makers and law enforcement agencies alike. The rise of computational power 
combined with the availability of big, case-specific, data will enable wide deployment 
of such initiatives. 
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Mrs Stella Dimitsaki for her technical support. Finally, I would like to thank my par-
ents, Antonios and Nikoletta, my brother Efthymios for all the late-night discussions, 
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1 Introduction 
The IT sector has evolved rapidly in recent decades resulting in the digitization of pro-
cesses and databases of both private and public organizations. The effects of the prolif-
eration of internet use have both positive and negative effects on the general population 
as well as organizations and the states across the globe (Brass & Sowell, 2020; 
Gruenewald, Allison-Gruenewald, & Klein, 2015; Kwon & Rao, 2017; Kelarestaghi, 
Heaslip, Khalilikhah, Fuentes, & Fessman, 2018; Li, Xu, Wang, Chen, & Sun, 2018; 
Papadaki et al., 2017; Noel, Harley, Tam, Limiero, & Share, 2016).  
The positives include the automation of a variety of processes, the immediacy of 
communication and information as well as the ease of access to databases and files. Al-
so, due to the spread of the internet and the evolution of information technologies, new 
opportunities have been created for the economy, production and industry as well as the 
organization of various functions. The negatives include the increase in threats, espe-
cially in terms of network security, information and users' personal data. However, the 
threats seem to be increasing as well as the possibilities for dealing with them (Awan & 
Memon, 2016; Gardner, 2014; Koulas, 2019, Koulas et al., 2020). 
At the state level, different strategies are developed and different programs are im-
plemented which aim to facilitate the authorities in maintaining the security of citizens 
and their national interests. Typically, the European Union (hereinafter EU), the United 
States of America (hereinafter the USA) but also Asian countries such as China, Japan 
and India, participate in programs to address asymmetric threats (terrorism, internation-
al crime) and of simple breaches in their networks (Awan & Memon, 2016; Gardner, 
2014; Gruenewald, Allison-Gruenewald, & Klein, 2015; Jung & Park, 2014). For the 
EU, in particular, it is observed that this task is undertaken by the Union itself in coop-
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eration with NATO and, at national level, by its Member States separately (Koulas, 
2019).1  
Knowledge graphs are a state-of-the-art assistive technology that was originally de-
veloped by software companies to help users search for information and navigate web 
pages (Pirrò, 2015). For example, Google, Yahoo, and Facebook, like many other com-
panies, use knowledge graphs to correlate information and facilitate search. The logic of 
knowledge graphs is to make connections between information, people and events and 
to reveal relationships, for example, between two people (Noy, et al., 2019). 
Typically, knowledge graph technology can be used to analyze whether a terrorist 
attack is linked to a person, or whether two terrorists are linked. These technologies are 
so highly developed that this information can be linked and patterns created even if their 
relationship is not immediately apparent. Also, knowledge graphs work because they 
use both material that has already been categorized in databases (tables) and material 
that is related to the lower case, for example various texts that are published on the in-
ternet (Pirrò, 2015). 
As a technology, knowledge graphs perform in various fields and offer the oppor-
tunity for immediate processing and disclosure of relationships between seemingly un-
related factors. In cybersecurity, for example, knowledge graphs can provide infor-
mation to the user about the threat of cyber intrusions, the security of users and infor-
mation, and the type of threats (Collarana, et al., 2018; Iannacone, et al., 2015; Noy, et 
al., 2019). 
 
1 In the United States in particular, however, there seems to be an active dialogue be-
tween political leaders, pressure groups, the media and public opinion, especially after 
9/11, regarding the state's ability to secure borders and the cyberspace of the United 
States. The main reason is the attack on the Twin Towers in 2001, which is understood 
by internationalists as the day that finally marked the end of the short period of US he-
gemony in the International System. Moreover, in the United States, there is a strong 
emphasis on tackling the refugee issue and illegal immigration, as well as early detec-
tion of international threats (Mearsheimer, 2011). 
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Also, the application of knowledge graphs so far in homeland security has proven to 
be important for the following reasons (Kaynar, 2016; Miehling, Rasouli, & Teneketzis, 
2015; Noel, Harley, Tam, Limiero, & Share, 2016): 
- They can give the users perspective and information 
- To bring to the surface patterns that will help the states to deal more effectively with 
the threats that may concern the public and national security and the protection of the 
national interests of the states. 
This paper will examine the issue of Homeland Security with an emphasis on the 
strategies of the USA, the EU and Asian countries such as China and India for tackling 
terrorism, international crime and illegal immigration. Moreover, the scope of this paper 
is to identify the challenges associated with terrorism in the aforementioned regions us-
ing knowledge graphs.   
In detail, the paper will be structured as such: 
- The first chapter is the introductory one  
- The second chapter consists of the literature review. The methodology used is 
that of the systematic literature review assessing a wide variety of articles that 
refer to either national security and the strategies of the regions under study or 
the use of knowledge graphs and attack graphs in the study of terrorism and its 
impact in those regions.  
- The third chapter is that of the methodology of the research part of the paper, 
meaning the transformation of data with regard to terrorism, and the ontology 
for the purpose of creating a knowledge graph.  
- The fourth chapter focuses on the presentation of the data and findings. In this 
chapter some testing queries are run, in order to show the capabilities of the 
knowledge graph. 
- Last, the final chapter, that of the conclusions, is dedicated to a summary of the 
findings of the paper as well as the discussion of the limitations of the present 
study as well as the author’s suggestions for future research. 
The contribution of this research to the available academic literature is great. This is 
because homeland security is extremely important in ensuring the well-being of states 
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and the use of knowledge graphs can go a long way in maintaining an optimal level of 
security for states around the world.  
However, due to the fact that this thesis revolves around a rather contested topic, it 
is crucial to underline that the opinions, statements and findings of the paper do not, 
necessarily, reflect the views of the supervisors of the thesis. Accordingly, any state-
ments and comments are not, necessarily, supported by either the supervisors or any 
other members of the University and are conclusions drawn by the study of material as 
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2 Literature Review 
In this chapter I will review relevant literature, as well as, the methodology used to ac-
quire said literature. 
2.1 Methodology 
A systematic and / or critical literature review are amongst the most used methods of 
elaboration of studies and works and contributes to ensuring a broader, global and abso-
lute understanding of the subject. In the present dissertation, the method of systematic 
literature review (S.L.R.) was chosen for the theoretical study of the two main topics 
related the work. These are: 
1. homeland security (HS), and 
2. the use of knowledge graphs for HS purposes. 
For the theoretical study of the above, at first, the author aimed at selecting the most 
relevant material from academic sources such as Google scholar, Elsevier, Scopus as 
well as other related databases such as the Research gate. Specific criteria were set for 
the sorting of these papers as part of the quality assessment.  
Also, when it comes to the suitability and the quality of each paper, additional crite-
ria were applied. These are the following: 
- Question 1: Is the paper properly structured?  
- Question 2: Is the paper relevant? 
- Question 3: Does the paper come up with conclusions using an appropriate 
methodology? 
To assess the criteria, the following method is used: 
For question 1: 
- All papers that are used must have an introduction, a main part and a conclusion 
- All papers have an abstract 
- The full citation is available  
For question 2, the following are assessed: 
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- all papers are recent, meaning that they have been published after 2014  
- all papers have more than 20 citations and are reviewed before their publication 
- the material used is either academic papers or conference papers and / or official 
reports that were published by officially recognized institutions (i.e. NATO, the 
EU, the UN etc).  
For question 3: 
- The methodology is clear 
- The data (if used) is included and / or appropriately cited 
- The conclusions are followed by limitations  
Then, the keywords for each of the above categories are selected words and terms 
that, based on a first review of the available academic literature, seem to be fully con-
sistent with the topic. Thus, the following are selected as keywords in order to discuss 
the HS and its importance, impact and different aspects: 
- Homeland security  
- Homeland security terrorism  
- Homeland security cyberterrorism  
Particular emphasis is placed on the last two categories of studies, namely articles 
and studies on terrorism and cybersecurity in relation to terrorism.  
Then, for the second aspect and the second level of analysis, ie the use of knowledge 
graphs, material was searched with the following keywords: 
- knowledge graphs homeland security 
- use of knowledge graphs security and defense 
- knowledge graphs security terrorism 
Based on the material identified in the content analysis, emphasis is placed on the 
results and conclusions of the literature selected for analysis. Last, it is noted that the 
material is not selected based on the own assumptions and viewpoint of the author and 
neither does it reflect the opinions of the members of the university.  
2.2 Homeland Security 
As it is mentioned above, the main methodology of this chapter is the S.L.R. Overall, 
the number of available sources were thousands in Google Scholar alone. However, the 
  -7- 
following are applicable to the paper and have been later on rejected based on the 
aforementioned criteria and given that a vast majority only included references to other 
papers on HS and / or were students’ papers and theses and not actual papers on HS. 
Out of the 59.000 papers and books, 40 were assessed for the paper and 10 are used as 
they fit all the criteria set above. The material selected for the study of HS is presented 
in the following table. The papers that have been reviewed yet not included in this 
S.L.R. are presented in a full table in the appendix of the study. 
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The first article studied for the purposes of this dissertation concerns the study of 
Hiestra (2014) in relation to the application of HS for immigration management and de-
tention system in the United States. Specifically, the researcher argues that the detention 
system is, nowadays, part of the government’s imaginary and apparatus to achieve HS. 
More specifically, Hiestra (2014) considers that the implementation of such practices 
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encourages the development of xenophobic behaviors and exacerbates internal problems 
in the United States. To support this argument, he critically interprets the concept of HS. 
Thus, they argue that this term is used as a synonym for “national security” and, there-
fore, in public discourse and political rhetoric, is associated with the fight against terror-
ism and crime. As a result, for the researcher, it is considered that policies to ensure in-
ternal stability in the name of HS tend to project a specific, patriarchal model, which 
connects America with a) whites, b) heterogeneity, c) nuclear family and the ideals as-
sociated with this particular notion of “security” that precludes the different (Hiemstra, 
2014). 
Next, one can focus on the study of Kahan (2015) which investigates how and why 
the US invests in HS, especially from September 11, 2011 onwards. This article ex-
plains that, in the context of the implementation of policies to enhance security and re-
silience in the United States, different and related policies are designed, yet, the officials 
seem to address various priorities. Simultaneously, it is discussed that there are numer-
ous terms used to describe the concept of HS which, mostly, relate to resilience as well 
as the concept of resilience in relation to strategy and tactics. The overall definitions 
gathered by Kahan (2015) are directly related to the subject of the present study and 
serve to better understand how research and implementation of policies are done in rela-
tion to maintaining a high level of security and functionality of institutions. The differ-
ent interpretations given to resilience therefore concern: the resilience of systems and 
structures, the stability, the duration, the ability of the state to deal with terrorist threats, 
the dynamic capabilities and the readiness.  
This article further discusses the importance of resilience within structures. There-
fore, according to Kahan (2015), HS analysis concerns the a) individuals, b) infrastruc-
ture, c) actors, d) systems and e) community. So, in order for there to be duration, stabil-
ity and efficiency, there must also be communication, consistency of policies and set-
ting clear goals. Accordingly, for the strategy and organization of the institutions it is 
necessary to implement policies for the development of resilience of different institu-
tions and institutions in order to maximize security and stability. Last, it is essential to 
plan to be able to respond immediately to crises and emergencies, as well as measure 
performance with specific indicators, standards and criteria (Kahan, 2015). 
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On the other hand, Sageman (2014) seems to focus more on the ethical dilemmas 
posed above for science and the media and less for the general public. More specifical-
ly, they point out that terrorism studies and research are mistakenly thought to have 
started in the United States in 2001, which he believes leads to the notion that terrorism 
is linked to the teaching of the Qur’an Islam in general. As a consequence, as discussed 
above, in Kahan (2015)’s article HS seems to be equated with youth mobilization and 
the treatment or “rescue” of Muslims in the US and outside the US (Britain, Middle 
East, EU). In addition, the author addresses the fact that the structures and agencies cre-
ated after 2001, the statements of officials as well as the attitude of the media shape the 
consciousness of citizens and influence research and scientific development in the field 
of strategic and political studies, therefore, special attention is required from research-
ers. 
Next, the importance of the evolution of law and legislation in relation to homeland 
security in the US is studied. Gardner’s (2014) research, on which this analysis is based, 
shows that the evolution of case law in this area is rapid, especially in the period 2001-
2008, which is attributed, as Kahan (2015) analyzes, to the increase of external and 
internal threats to the US. In detail, Gardner (2014) notes that the first appearance of the 
term seems to be attributed to the letter of President Bush in 2002 who chose the term 
“homeland” and “national security” instead of “federal”, which translates into an 
attempt to Recognition of the “shared responsibility” of all American citizens for 
security threats in the country. During the Bush administration, the DHS (Department of 
Homeland Security) was created, which, according to the researcher, aims to promote 
cooperation at the federal, state and local levels in addressing the threat of terrorism and 
immigration. Flows. However, from 2008 onwards, the power and obligation of the 
police to intervene in matters relating to illegal immigration was reduced and, thus, the 
need arose to institutionalize the role of each of the law enforcement agencies in the 
United States. The Printz ruling is considered a milestone because it was discussed 
before the Supreme Court whether state power has limits and whether there should be a 
concentration of power in times of insecurity, as well as issues of recruitment, majority 
power and interpretation of the constitution. 
In detail, for the importance of this decision, the researcher notes the following 
(Gardner, 2014): 
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1) national security, homeland security and national emergency are not synony-
mous terms and must be approached without allowing a hegemonic minority to 
accumulate power 
2) when authorities, states and institutions disagree, consensus must be reached 
3) no emergency can lead to the violation of the rights set out in the constitution 
Having analyzed both the concept and importance of preparedness (Hiemstra, 2014; 
Kahan, 2015) and the role of institutions (Gardner, 2014), it is possible to assess at this 
point whether police authorities are able to manage the threats that the US face and are 
directly linked to HS. More specifically, Haynes & Giblin (2014) investigate how police 
authorities, especially in small police departments, prepare to manage risks mainly re-
lated to terrorism and organized crime. For this reason, the researchers collected data 
from three hundred and fifty small police units and focused on the following questions: 
a) what are the external risks and what are the internal risks for which the asymp-
tomatic are prepared? 
b) how is HS related to risk management? 
c) what are the main dimensions on which these bodies focus theoretically and 
practically? 
Based on this research, it appears that, ultimately, organizations tend to take 
measures to address asymmetric external threats focusing on homeland security, time 
management and reducing the vulnerability of institutions. It is also found, however, 
that, in essence, risk management strategies do not appear to increase safety, prepared-
ness and flexibility, and the risk under consideration is, in each case, different and sub-
jectively assessed. In particular, each unit tends to be organized on the basis of the per-
sonal perceptions of police and armed forces personnel and not on the basis of available 
data and, in fact, for a specific period of time and not as part of an integrated strategy 
(Haynes & Giblin, 2014). 
Examining the readiness of players at the national level, Gruenewald, Allison-
Gruenewald, & Klein (2015) agree with Kahan (2015) and Haynes & Giblin (2014) that 
internal problems in the US worsened after on September 11 and claim that HS was di-
rectly involved in dealing with the terrorist threat, as found by the SLR which has been 
done in this section. The researchers also showed that the principles of Situational 
Crime Prevention apply to the study of HS and its applications / consequences as the 
-12- 
two are common and the criteria set for the analysis of events and the assessment of the 







- near  
- easy  
The researchers point out that the aim is for the authorities to be able to “think” as 
terrorists and, therefore, to identify in time the possible targets of parastatal / terrorist 
groups and organizations, the risks and the mechanisms. Special emphasis is also placed 
on the image of terrorists, the viability of policies and measures as well as the legitima-
cy of the authorities’ actions. More specifically, for the purposes of these groups, Grue-
newald et al. (2015) showed that the more “obvious” the consequences of a crime, the 
more likely they are to pose a threat to national security in the US, so civilians are at 
much greater risk (79%) if they are in public buildings or working for major agencies 
than if they are ordinary citizens and live outside the center (5%). This means that HS 
can be adapted to reduce the risks to stability and peace within the US as discussed in 
the Hiemstra (2014) article and to maximize the efficiency and functionality of institu-
tions as widely stated above (Gardner , 2014; Haynes & Giblin, 2014; Hiemstra, 2014; 
Kahan, 2015). 
The perspectives and possibilities of dealing with crises, the threat of terrorism and 
external / internal cyber threats are also examined in the study of Kelarestaghi et al. 
(2018). The researchers propose a complex model for risk assessment developed by the 
National Institute of Standard and Technology (NIST) – NIST SP 800-30 which is 
based on three objectives (Kelarestaghi, Heaslip, Khalilikhah, Fuentes, & Fessman, 
2018 ): 
 
2 The acronym formed by the eight (8) key points of the Situational Crime Prevention approach is “EVIL 
DONE” (Gruenewald, Allison-Gruenewald, & Klein, 2015, p. 433). 
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- identifying security challenges and “security gaps” in the system 
- identifying threats 
- seeking the impact of the hacking incident. 
This way, the network administrators will be able to minimize threat and vulnerabil-
ity and achieve the overall goals of the agencies that can be impacted by cyber security 
threats. In addition, in their paper, the researchers point out the need to use advanced 
communication tools and to invest in the creation of networks to reduce both digital / 
online / cyber threat and physical threats (Kelarestaghi, Heaslip, Khalilikhah, Fuentes, 
& Fessman, 2018). 
The study by Kaunert & Leonard, (2019), which examines how counter-terrorism 
threats affect the EU and how it responds to its internal threats by applying similar sys-
tems to the US, differs significantly from the above articles. In detail, researchers com-
pare the creation of agencies such as DHS (Gardner, 2014) with the strengthening of 
Europol’s role. Thus, this research shows that, as in the case of the USA, in the EU, 
bodies and means have been created to deal with terrorism and the common threat, alt-
hough there is no reference to “homeland” security but EU security and but follow the 
example of the Bush presidency. Therefore, the EU institutions and, consequently, 
member states voted in favor of (Kaunert & Leonard, 2019): 
- the Directive 2017/541 on combating terrorism in the EU 
- agreements for co-operation with the ASEAN  
- agreements for co-operation with the states in the Schengen zone and the Euro-
pean Economic Area to address the common challenges faced by the EU and its 
neighbouring countries.  
Similarly, Awan & Memon (2016) research focuses on an environment and subsys-
tem that is not directly relevant to the United States but more indirectly – Pakistan and 
the Middle East. This research also begins with the assumption that counter-terrorism 
studies and practices have intensified since 2001, and that, for the United States and its 
international allies (inside and outside NATO), Emphasis seems to be given to areas 
such as: 
- countering cyber – terrorism 
- e-government and the digitization of data and services 
- ensuring stability in the international system 
-14- 
- decreasing nuclear threat 
- strengthening the position of Middle Eastern countries in the international econ-
omy.  
Finally, the research of Le and Hoang (2016) examines on a global scale how all the 
above issues discussed are related. For this purpose, they analyze and evaluate the de-
gree of suitability and application of the Security Maturity Model in information tech-
nology and in relation to cyber terrorism. This model is as follows: 
A. Managers consider the extent to which the system is secure based on investment 
in security and sustainability 
B. the analysis is divided into five steps and five sets of criteria set: 
1) initial level – assessment of the primary practices, the different levels of analysis 
and requirements of the system 
2) repetition and maturity – assessment of the sets of practices multiple times 
3) definition of the problem and aims 
4) management – particularly software and systems 
5) optimization  
Thus, it appears that the different levels can be evaluated with different softwares or 
methods. Based on this research, one understands that tackling cybersecurity-related 
problems actually starts, as argued above (Gardner, 2014; Haynes & Giblin, 2014; 
Kaunert & Leonard, 2019) from the grassroots level. The researchers also argue that the 
structures, methods and systems used by each state in relation to the management of 
digital systems, security and the operation of the market, among many, determine which 
systems can be applied in each case. Therefore, because in the US the whole system is 
oriented towards the achievement of HS, the Security Maturity Model is a suitable tool. 
The same is true for the EU where the organization and management of institutions and 
functions are effective and appropriate for tackling external threats, both real and digital 
(Le & Hoang, 2016).  
Having considered the aforementioned conclusions, this essay will attempt to inves-
tigate whether knowledge graphs are as an appropriate tool, how they are used and why. 
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2.3 The use of knowledge graphs for homeland se-
curity purposes 
The methodology followed for this, second section of the S.L.R. is similar to that of sec-
tion 2.3. Overall, in the platforms assessed online, 16.800 papers, books and conference 
materials were identified. Similarly, after a careful examination of the material and an 
exclusion of students’ papers and irrelevant material, out of those, 29 were reviewed 
and 9 used.  The papers that have been reviewed yet not included in this S.L.R. are pre-
sented in a full table in the appendix of the study. 
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4 Although this paper has only 3 citations it is included because a) it is directly related to the topic of the 
S.L.R., b) it is innovative, c) has scientific value for the issues discussed.  
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 Hu et al. (2017) discuss that, as the challenges become more complex, technologies 
should be developed and quantitative models and tools used to address internal and ex-
ternal threats to states and organizations. In turn, the researchers suggest the use of: 
• STS Spatial - Time Sequence - Based Methods, that are a statistical method to 
process chaotic time series 
• GTM Graph Theory Based Models that include, among others, the weighted 
planning knowledge graphs, Markov’s chains and Markov’s prediction models 
and attack graphs 
• GAT Game - Theory Based Methods, which are mathematical methods to pre-
dict behaviors. 
In this section, the second category of models and quantitative methods will be as-
sessed.  
Starting from the paper of Iannacone et al. (2015) this concerns the application of 
knowledge graphs in various fields, especially cybersecurity. This paper analyzes, in 
particular, how databases are created, how they can be processed by researchers, the ca-
pabilities and limitations of KGs. Thus, in relation to the capabilities and usefulness of 
KGs, it is mentioned, first of all, the usability, the increased security that they provide as 
well as the possibility for automation of the processes that they offer. Therefore, these 
systems can be used in the context of HS policies as they address the problem of vul-
nerability, are flexible, technologically advanced and offer immediate intervention in 
the event of threats. At the same time, KGs allow for the location of the user and the IP 
that are blacklisted are excluded immediately. Also, KGs trace relationships, connec-
tions and can help locate a malware. The main advantage of their use is that the data can 
be reused and remodelled (Iannacone, et al., 2015). 
Indeed, based on the paper of Noy et al. (2019) one can note that there are a number 
of alternative models, software and tools that a researcher may use for data processing 
and the creation of KGs. The key impact of the use of KGs for Noy et al. (2019) is that 
they allow the user to make data more structured and functional and that they are practi-
cal and cost-effective. Also, they mention that the application of KGs does not only 
concern HS and defense but a wide range of organizations and business sectors, due to 
the adaptability and usability of the graphs. For this reason, a number of tech companies 
have developed their own tools to allow the user to create a KG. The models, size and 
stages of development of each product are summarized as such (Noy, et al., 2019, p. 5): 
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- Microsoft uses a single ontology to include types of entities, their relations and 
attributes. The size of the graphs is two billion entities (primary) and around 55 
billion facts and the product is currently used by multiple companies. 
- Google uses KGs that include a wide range of entities that are strongly typed. 
The size of the graphs is one billion entities with over seventy assertions and the 
product is also actively used. 
- Facebook uses graphs that allow for a structured insertion and processing of data 
and optional indexes. Each graph can include over 50 million entities (primary) 
and 500 million assertions, with the product been currently used.  
- Ebay follows the model of Google, yet the size of the graphs is around 100 mil-
lion produces and the product is under development (2019). 
- IBM uses graphs and models that allow the association of various data (entities 
and relations) and have various sizes. The product is actively used and offered 
for clients.   
The researchers point out that KGs are, indeed, ideal tools to predict behaviours and 
events. However, they can be challenging as a) they use advanced AI, especially when 
one processes big data and, therefore, training and expertise on behalf of the user is re-
quired, b) the user must make sure that all the data included are correct, which is often 
an impossible challenge, c) in case a company wants to sell their product, it is necessary 
that the client be trained as well. 
Having considered the use and advantages of the creation of KGs, one can, then, 
proceed with an analysis of their application in HS. Noel et al. (2016) in their study ex-
plain that the tools available today can indeed be used in a variety of ways to enhance 
network security, preparedness and the ability of operators to deal with cyber threats. 
More specifically, the authors suggest the use of Cy Graph which is a system created 
based on these needs and priorities5.  This system supports the decision-making process, 
 
5 The function of the Cy Graph and its architecture can be described as such (Noel, Harley, Tam, Limiero, 
& Share, 2016, p. 7): 
1. Ingest: network infrastructure / security posture / cyberthreats / mission dependencies 
2. Transformation  
3. Analysis through a graph model: dynamics / layering / grouping / filtering / hierarchies 
4. Visualization 
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increases the readiness of the agencies and identifies vulnerability paths. In addition, in 
case of real threats, Cy Graph sends alerts and suggests ways to resolve the crisis. Its 
main advantage is that it works with other software, and can be used by real users or by 
automated systems (digital / computer) (Noel, Harley, Tam, Limiero, & Share, 2016). 
For HS the use of Cy Graph can be a solution to address internal and external threats 
and detect malware, intruders and threats. Already, according to Noel et al. (2016) US 
DHS, DISA and NIST seem to collaborate and take advantage of the possibilities pro-
vided by the use of KG and Cy Graph. The advantage of Cy Graph KGs seems to be 
that they are used to create a variety of tools and databases as well as graphs for threat 
analysis. Additional tools are: 
- GOTS (Government off-the-shelf attack graph analyses) i.e. TVA and NetSPA 
- COTS (commercial off-the-shelf KGs), i.e. Skybox and RedSeal.  
The potential data sources include national and commercial vulnerability databases, 
cyber mission assessments and other relevant sources. Also, Cy Graph is suitable for the 
analysis and synthesis of big data and to act as a) a direct tool that is usable by a client, 
b) a server and c) an intermediary (Noel, Harley, Tam, Limiero, & Share, 2016). 
The use of databases that specialize in specialized sectors or that are particularly as-
sociated with a particular issue are, is of great importance for the management of the 
risks associated with terrorism in cyberspace or in the physical space. Xia & Gu (2019) 
recommend the use of KGs to extract data from the Wikipedia website to better under-
stand terrorist attacks and improve the research methodology of this type of data. More 
specifically, their methodology is as follows: 
 
Figure 1: brief description of the process of the creation of the TKG (Xia & Gu, 2019, p. 195), 
all rights reserved by the authors. 
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 To create the Terrorism Knowledge Graph, Xia & Gu (2019) consider six different 
parameters which concern: 
- The identification and details of the incident 
- The “weapon” used for a given threat, attack, incident etc. 
- The perpetrator(s), meaning the people or group of people that are responsible 
for the incident 
- The location, therefore the place of the attack (country, region, city etc.) 
- The target of the attack  
- The damage caused (physical, financial) as well as the total fatalities 
Then, the construction of the Terrorist KGs is done using one of three methods: a) ex-
tracting data and knowledge from structured data that include country specific or field / 
hierarchic information, b) free text, that can be used to add notes and extract facts, c) the 
Wikipedia infobox to extract, pair and organize values.  Microsoft excel ™ and other 
statistics software can be used for the extraction and organization of the data and the 
different graphs (Xia & Gu, 2019). 
Next, Jones, Bridges, Huffer, & Goodall (2015) equally emphasize the fact that data 
on terrorism, defense and security, in most cases, are not categorized from the outset by 
the competent authorities or the persons who publish the information. they. Therefore, a 
more specialized processing of information is required, often from free text, as empha-
sized by Xia & Gu (2019). 
The methods that can be used to resolve this issue are varied. First, Jones et al. 
(2015) suggest the use of specially designed techniques for automatic search and entry 
of information, which can be done with relation extraction. This method is a tool for 
evaluating physical speech to retrieve data related to the name, location and other rele-
vant information about an object. This information covers what is stated in their texts 
and Iannacone, et al., (2015) and Noel, et al. (2016). Alternatively, each researcher or 
developer can create a new algorithm to process and categorize data. The key method to 
achieve that is through relations and patterns. The researcher either enters (manually or 
with the use of a software) all words that are part of speech or selected words and parts 
of speech. Afterwards, a parse tree path is created to discover the patterns and databases 
(Jones, Bridges, Huffer, & Goodall, 2015).  
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At this point, also, it is interesting to add some notes on the study of Collarana, et al. 
(2018) who have used mathematical and computational models as part of the MINTE+ 
framework6 that can be used in policy making, market research, manufacturing and law 
among others. The researchers suggest that such models can be used to process various 
data from different databases that are complex and related to (Collarana, et al., 2018): 
- Search for activity of specific individuals (i.e. politicians) online.  
- Location of fanatics and terrorists and monitoring of their activities online 
- Posts, add and relevant material on illegal trade, selling and distribution of 
drugs, guns etc. 
Next, more focused on creating specialized models for defense and security is the 
article by Miehling, Rasouli, & Teneketzis (2015) which addresses the need to create 
effective, independent and flexible models for predicting potential security issues. More 
specifically, this study focuses on the development of software and protocols for the 
protection of national systems in the US, which is a key part of the policy and objectives 
of DHS and its respective teams (ICT - CERT). The researchers point out that perhaps 
the biggest threat and malfunction of the systems currently in place in the United States 
is that vulnerabilities are numerous and therefore it is difficult to defend the cyberspace 
and the networks across the US. Also, the handling of the network at the moment is an 
additional challenge for the "defenders" due to the fact the fact that a) the network is 
vulnerable and b) the paths are infinite, therefore, it allows the successful outcome of 
the perpetrators' attempts to violate security systems (Miehling, Rasouli, & Teneketzis, 
2015). 
The attack graphs studied by Miehling, Rasouli, & Teneketzis (2015) are graphs that 
can cover a lot of information but, typically, are large and difficult to create and to be 
monitored by a single user. It is emphasized that the MTD (Move Target Defense) type 
schemes can solve many of these issues as they are models used for defense and safety 
and are dynamically adapted to different situations. In the same lines, Kaynar (2016) 
article classifies the various attack graphs that can be used and the modeling process to 
create them. Like Noy et al. (2019) so Kaynar (2016) agrees that the first step in creat-
ing attack graphs is the determination of the initial privileges and the goals of the at-
tacker. Then, the users can select among a number of tools and methods to determine 
 
6 The MINTE+ framework is RDF based and used for the synthesis of data. 
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which one is more applicable. The conditions, vulnerabilities, historical data as well as 
the templates and models can enable the user to be more functional and to tackle the 
threat timely and effectively. 
Typically, these models can be utilized to locate multiple intruder locations, reduce 
the intruder's ability to breach databases, or allow the operator (defender) to temporarily 
alter network characteristics to ensure network protection. The problem, in this case, is 
that network connectivity and responsiveness are affected (Miehling, Rasouli, & Tene-
ketzis, 2015).  
The researchers, in this case, use Bayesian Attack Graphs which result from the ap-
plication of mathematical models (probabilities) and statistical analysis. The mathemat-
ical investigation of the possibility of attack allows the immediate response of the de-
fender. Essentially, the user (defender) examines based on the BAGs the capabilities of 
the attacker at a given time (t) and his attributes and then adjusts the reaction of the en-
tire system and network. The attributes are usually numerous although key attributes are 
identified which are the main focus of the attacker. In a typical model, the defender will 
have specific options, such as disconnecting the system or blocking a specific move of 
the attacker. Therefore, a cost estimate is made using a BAG and then the best possible 




7 Note: due to the fact that the model used in the study of Miehling et al. (2015) is not directly applicable 
to the main methodology of the present study, the full model is not included in this S.L.R. 
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3 Materials and Methods 
In this chapter I will discuss the technology stack used for the implementation of the 
experiment, as well as the datasets used, along with the data cleaning processes for each 
dataset. 
3.1 Technology 
The used technologies are divided into two parts. Initially for the data cleaning and the 
data analysis I am using Python v.3.8.5 and Jupyter Notebook v.6.03, through 
Anaconda Navigator, along with some unorthodox, yet effective techniques involving 
Notepad and Microsoft Excel 2019, in order to address obstacles described later. 
 For the construction of the knowledge graphs, I am using Neo4j Desktop 
Community Edition v.1.3.11, Graph Database v.4.2.1, and for the scripting I am using 
the Neo4j’s specific language Cypher. While processing our data we need to keep in 
mind Neo4j’s limitations, only csv data can be imported. Regarding the dataset, I opted 
to eradicate the null values from the RAND database, while I preserved them in the 
GTD, this way, two different approaches can be showcased. 
3.2 RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Inci-
dents 
The first dataset used for the purposes of this thesis is the RAND Database of 
Worldwide Terrorism Incidents. 
3.2.1 Description 
The RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents contains data pertaining to Ter-
rorism related incidents from 1968 to 2009 (RAND Corporation, nd.). This dataset con-
tains valuable information on various aspects of terrorism. It contains over 40,000 inci-
dents of terrorist attacks, incorporated from various sources. The RAND Corporation 
offers the day to pay the database free and publicly in order to help researchers and ana-
lysts achieve informed predictions. 
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 The data set contains 8 distinct values: 
• Date on which the incident happened, 
• City in which the incident happened, 
• Country in which the City is, 
• Perpetrator of the incident, 
• Weapon used, 
• Number of Injured, 
• Number of Fatalities, and 
• Description of the incident. 
3.2.2 Data Cleaning 
The dataset contains 40129 instances. The first problem that is encountered with the da-
taset is that, even though it is a csv file, meaning that all the data should be in the first 
column, separated by commas, it is not the case. If we use the Excel filter function in 
the second column, excluding the blank cells we get 622 instances that have their De-
scription column spanning in multiple cells. 
 
 
Figure 2: RDWTI Instances where the last column spans in multiple cells. 
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 In order to address this issue, an unorthodox, yet simple and effective approach was 
taken. We copied the entirety of the dataset in a txt file. The Notepad application auto-
matically inserts a Tab space when there are multiple columns. This way a simple Re-
place function, where there is a Tab space with a single space merges all the lines that 
have multiple columns, while at the same time leaving intact the lines that are properly 
formatted. Finally, we save the txt file, for good measure, while we copy the entire da-
taset back to a new csv file. 
 
Figure 3: Notepad Replace function. 
 
 The next problem we face, is when we load the RDWTI on a Pandas DataFrame in 
Python. As we see in Figure 4,  in lines 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8, out of the first 10 lines, all 
the information is placed in the first column, while leaving all the other columns with 
null values. After experimentation, I have concluded that, this happens because those 
lines have cells within quotation marks, because their value contains one, or multiple 
commas, e.g. line 4, City “Washington, D.C.” or line 3, Description “CHILE.  An ex-
plosion from a single stick of dynamite went off on the patio of the Santiago Binational 




Figure 4: Problem when loading the RDWTI on a Pandas DataFrame. 
In order to solve this issue, I exported the DataFrame into an xlsx document. There 
using the replace function, I removed all the commas (68471 replacements), and subse-
quently all the double (52338 replacements) and single (11990) quotation marks. Due to 
the elimination of all the commas, and as a result, the quotation marks, the data can be 
properly loaded. 
 Before the data is loaded, I used the Excel Filter function, in order to manually add 
the values of missing cells, as Unknown. There were 4977 instances where the City was 
missing, 4 instances where the Perpetrator was missing, 3 instances where the Weapon 
was missing, and 2 instances where the Description was missing. 
 
Figure 5: The final version of the DataFrame 
 After all this procedure, the dataset is ready to be used. 
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3.2.3 Ontology 
In order to construct the graph, an ontology needed to be created beforehand. This is the 
design I opted for. 
 
Figure 6: Ontology for RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents. 
3.3 Global Terrorism Database 
The second dataset used for the purposes of this thesis is the Global Terrorism Dataset. 
3.3.1 Description 
The Global Terrorism Database contains data pertaining to Terrorism related incidents 
from 1970 to 2018 (Lafree et al., 2006; LaFree et al., 2014; University of Maryland., 
2019). This dataset contains valuable information on various aspects of terrorism. It 
contains over 191,000 incidents of terrorist attacks, along with 135 attributes, incorpo-
rated from various sources. 
 The information in GTD can be summarized and divided into nine general areas: 
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• GTD ID and Date 
• Incident Information 
• Incident Location 
• Attack Information 
• Weapon Information 
• Target/Victim Information 
• Perpetrator Information 
• Casualties and Consequences 
• Additional Information and Sources 
Going into more detail Table 3 includes all the variables in the Global Terrorism 
Database, along with their Explanation. 
Table 3: Name of Variables, with their Explanation, in GTD (University of Maryland., 2019) 
NAME Explanation 
eventid The ID of the incident 
iyear The year of the incident 
imonth The month of the incident 
iday The day of the incident 
approxdate The approximate date of the incident, if the actual date is not recorded 
extended If the incident lasted more than 24 hours 
resolution The date that the incident was resolved, if it was extended 
country Country Code 
country_txt The name of the country 
region Region Code 
region_txt The name of the region 
provstate The name of the first order subnation administrative region 
city The name of the city where the incident took place 
latitude The latitude of the city (WGS1984 Standards) 
longitude The longtitude of the city (WGS1984 Standards) 
specificity Geospatial resolution of latitude and longtitude 
vicinity If the incident occurred in the city itself or the immediate vincinity 
location Additional information about the location 
summary Incident Summary 
crit1 First Inclusion Criteria 
crit2 Second Inclusion Criteria 
crit3 Third Inclusion Criteria 
doubtterr Uncertainty if the Incident should be included 
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alternative Alternative Designation Code 
alternative_txt Alternative Designation 
multiple Part of Multiple Incident 
success If the attack was successful, based on its classification 
suicide If the perpetrator did not inded to survive the attack 
attacktype1 Method of attack's code 
attacktype1_txt Method of attack's explanation 
attacktype2 Second method of attack's code 
attacktype2_txt Second method of attack's explanation 
attacktype3 Third method of attack's code 
attacktype3_txt Third method of attack's explanation 
targtype1 Type of primary target code 
targtype1_txt Type of primary target 
targsubtype1 Specific type of primary target code 
targsubtype1_txt Specific type of primary target 
corp1 Name of primary Company or Government Agency targeted 
target1 Specific primary person, building, installation etc targeted 
natlty1 Nationality of the primary Target code 
natlty1_txt Nationality of the primary Target 
targtype2 Type of second target code 
targtype2_txt Type of second target 
targsubtype2 Specific type of second target code 
targsubtype2_txt Specific type of second  target 
corp2 Name of second Company or Government Agency targeted 
target2 Specific second person, building, installation etc targeted 
natlty2 Nationality of the second Target code 
natlty2_txt Nationality of the second Target 
targtype3 Type of third target code 
targtype3_txt Type of third target 
targsubtype3 Specific type of third target code 
targsubtype3_txt Specific type of third target 
corp3 Name of third Company or Government Agency targeted 
target3 Specific third person, building, installation etc targeted 
natlty3 Nationality of the third Target code 
natlty3_txt Nationality of the third Target 
gname Perpetrator name 
gsubname Additional details to perpertrator's name 
gname2 Second perpetrator name 
gsubname2 Additional details to second perpertrator's name 
gname3 Third perpetrator name 
gsubname3 Additional details to third perpertrator's name 
motive Motive behind the attack 
guncertain1 If the involvement of the primary perpetrator is reported by sources 
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guncertain2 If the involvement of the second perpetrator is reported by sources 
guncertain3 If the involvement of the third perpetrator is reported by sources 
individual If the attack was carried out by individuals without affiliations 
nperps Number of Perpetrators 
nperpcap Number of Perpetrators Captured 
claimed If there has been Claim of Responsibility 
claimmode Claim of Responsibility Code 
claimmode_txt Claim of Responsibility Text 
claim2 Second Claim 
claimmode2 Second Claim of Responsibility Code 
claimmode2_txt Second Claim of Responsibility Text 
claim3 Third Claim 
claimmode3 Third Claim of Responsibility Code 
claimmode3_txt Third Claim of Responsibility Text 
compclaim More than one groups claiming responsibility 
weaptype1 Weapon of attack code 
weaptype1_txt Weapon of attack 
weapsubtype1 Sub-type of primary weapon code 
weapsubtype1_txt Sub-type of primary weapon 
weaptype2 Second weapon of attack code 
weaptype2_txt Second weapon of attack 
weapsubtype2 Sub-type of second weapon code 
weapsubtype2_txt Sub-type of second weapon code 
weaptype3 Third weapon of attack code 
weaptype3_txt Third weapon of attack 
weapsubtype3 Sub-type of third  weapon code 
weapsubtype3_txt Sub-type of third weapon 
weaptype4 Fourth weapon of attack code 
weaptype4_txt Fourth weapon of attack 
weapsubtype4 Sub-type of fourth  weapon code 
weapsubtype4_txt Sub-type of forth weapon 
weapdetail Any extra information regarding the weapons used 
nkill Total number of Fatalities 
nkillus Number of US Fatalities 
nkillter Number of Perpetrator Fatalities 
nwound Total number of Injuries 
nwoundus Number of US Injuries 
nwoundte Number of Perpetrator Injuries 
property Property damage 
propextent Extent of Property Damage 
propextent_txt Category of Extent of Property Damage 
propvalue Value of Property Damage 
propcomment Property Damage Comments 
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ishostkid If the victims were taken hostage or kidnapped 
nhostkid Total Number of Hostages/Kidnapping Victims 
nhostkidus Number of US  Hostages/Kidnapping Victims 
nhours Hours of Kidnapping/Hostage Incidenty 
ndays Days of Kidnapping/Hostage Incidenty 
divert Country That Kidnappers/Hijackers Diverted To 
kidhijcountry Country of Kidnapping/Hijacking Resolution 
ransom Ransom Demanded 
ransomamt Total Ransom Amount Demanded 
ransomamtus Ransom Amount Demanded from U.S. Sources 
ransompaid Total Ransom Amount Paid 
ransompaidus Ransom Amount Paid By U.S. Sources 
ransomnote Ransom Notes 
hostkidoutcome Kidnapping/Hostage Outcome Code 
hostkidoutcome_txt Kidnapping/Hostage Outcome 
nreleased Number Released/Escaped/Rescued 
addnotes Additional Notes 
scite1 First Source Citation 
scite2 Second Source Citation 
scite3 Third Source Citation 
dbsource Data Collection 
INT_LOG 
Comparison between nationality of perpetrator and location of attack, 
logistically driven 
INT_IDEO 
Comparison between nationality of perpetrator and nationality of tar-
get, ideologically driven 
INT_MISC 
Comparison between nationality of perpetrator and nationality of tar-
get, not necessarily ideologically or logistically driven 
INT_ANY Any of the above 
related Related incidents 
 
3.3.2 Data Cleaning 
The data contained in the dataset was formatted properly, thus there was no need to pro-
ceed with data cleaning. Another important factor contributing to this, is the choice to 
leave empty cells without filling them. 
 However, for performance reasons, I opted for slicing parts of the database, in order 
to load them on Neo4j. The following .csv files have been created: 
• City.csv, containing city, country_txt, provstate, region_txt, 
• Country.csv, containing country_txt, regiont_txt, 
• Perpetrator.csv, containing eventid, gname, motive, 
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• Provstate.csv, containing provstate, country_txt, region_txt, 
• Region.csv, containg region_txt, and 
• Target.csv, containing targtype1, targtype1_txt, targsubtype1, targsubtype1_txt, 
corp1, target1, natlty1, natlty1_txt. 
3.3.3 Ontology 
In order to construct the graph, an ontology needed to be created beforehand. This is the 













Figure 7: Global Terrorism Database Ontology 
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4 Results 
In this section I will run some indicative queries, to highlight the information that can 
be extracted by the knowledge graphs.  
4.1 RAND Database Graph 
1. Get the countries that were attacked by the Taliban 
Query: 
MATCH (n:Perp_Name)-[:ATTACKED]-
(Target_Country) WHERE n.name = "Taliban" RETURN n, Target_Country 
 
 
Figure 8: RDWTI Countries attacked by the Taliban 
 
2. Get all the Perpetrators that attacked Iraq 
Query 
MATCH (Perp_Name)-[:ATTACKED]-




Figure 9: RDWTI Perpetrators that attacked Iraq 
 
3. All the cities in Iraq that had an attack 
Query: 
MATCH (Target_City)-[:IS_IN]-
>(n:Target_Country) WHERE n.name="Iraq" RETURN n, Target_City 
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Figure 10: RDWTI All the cities in Iraq that had an attack 
4.2 Global Terrorism Database Graph 





Figure 11: GTD Graph Shema 


















WHERE i.eventid =200501200002.0 
RETURN i,p,m,w,wt,ws,t,tt,ts,corp,c,pr,r,cntr,n,ctn,d,at,ct 
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Figure 12: GTD Single incident by event id. 




WHERE c.name="Iraq" and p.description<>"Unknown" 




Figure 13: GTD All not unknown terrorist groups that attacked Iraq 
 
 









WHERE c.name="Iraq" AND wp.description= "Explosives" 
RETURN count(i); 
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Figure 15: GTD Total number of attacks in Iraq using explosives 





WHERE   p.description =~'(?i).*Al-
Qaida.*' AND c.name = "Iraq" AND wp.description="Explosives" 





Figure 16: GTD Attacks in Iraq by Al-Qaeda using explosives 
 
6. All the cities Al-Qaeda attacked. 
Query: 
MATCH (p:Perpetrator)-[:INCIDENT_PERP]-(i:Incident)<-[:INC_CITY]-(c:City) 
WHERE   p.description =~'(?i).*Al-Qaida.*' 
RETURN   DISTINCT c.name 
ORDER BY c.name; 
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Figure 17: GTD All the cities Al-Qaeda attacked 
 
7. All the incidents where Al-Qaeda was the perpetrator 
Query: 
MATCH q=(p:Perpetrator)-[:INCIDENT_PERP]-(i:Incident) 
WHERE   p.description =~'(?i).*Al-Qaida.*' 




Figure 18: GTD All the incidents where Al-Qaeda was the perpetrator 
 
8. All the information (nodes) conneceted in some way to Al-Qaeda (Al-Qaeda attacked 
Iraq, using Explosive, with Damage 5, and Crimetype Terror attack), limited to the first 



















WHERE   p.description =~'(?i).*Al-Qaida.*' 
AND wt.description= "Explosives" 
AND cntr.name = "Iraq" 





Figure 19: GTD All the information (nodes) conneceted in some way to Al-Qaeda 
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RETURN count (i); 
 
 
Figure 20: GTD Total number of incidents in Iraq 
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5 Conclusions and Future 
Work 
This project, in its entirety, has showcased the added value traditional security domains 
get, when merging with new technologies. Knowledge graphs in particular can become 
a valuable tool for researchers, national and transnational law enforcement agencies, as 
well as, policy makers. The ability to graphically depict known relationships can help 
for the uncovering of patterns, otherwise unattainable. 
The use of Knowledge Graphs in the area of Homeland Security can yield very in-
teresting results for law enforcement and policy makers. This thesis contributes a basic 
model that can be further enhanced. First of all, the next step is to insert in the ontology 
and the graph more information, accessible to law enforcement agencies, thus leading 
the graph to become richer in information. Besides that, Machine Learning Models can 
be leveraged in order to find patterns in the graph, that can lead to a more effective way 
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Appendix I 
The whole script used for constructing the RANDWTI graph. It is important to be run 
all at once. 
 
LOAD CSV WITH HEADERS FROM "file:///RAND1.csv" AS row 
MERGE (pName: Perp_Name {name: row.Perpetrator}) 
MERGE (Country: Target_Country {name: row.Country}) 
MERGE (City: Target_City {name: row.City}) 
MERGE (Incident: Incident {name: row.ID}) 
MERGE (pWeapon: Perp_weapon {name: row.Weapon}) 
MERGE (Description: Incident_Desc {name: row.Description}) 














The whole script used for constructing the GTD graph. 
 
LOAD CSV WITH HEADERS FROM "file:///gtd_incidents.csv" AS line 
WITH line WHERE line.eventid is not null 
CREATE (i:Incident {eventid: toFloat(line.eventid), year: toInteger(line.iyear), 
month:toInteger( line.imonth), day:toInteger( line.iday), approxdate: line.approxdate, 
summary: line.summary, latitude: toFloat(line.latitude),longitude: 
toFloat(line.longitude), country: line.country_txt,region: line.region_txt,provstate: 
line.provstate,city: line.city}); 
 
CREATE INDEX ind_eventid FOR (i:Incident) ON (i.eventid); 
CREATE INDEX ind_inc_country FOR (i:Incident) ON (i.country); 
CREATE INDEX ind_inc_region FOR (i:Incident) ON (i.region); 
CREATE INDEX ind_inc_provstate FOR (i:Incident) ON (i.provstate); 
CREATE INDEX ind_inc_city FOR (i:Incident) ON (i.city); 
 
LOAD CSV WITH HEADERS FROM "file:///gtd_incidents.csv" AS line 
WITH line WHERE line.eventid is not null 
CREATE (i:Incident {eventid: toFloat(line.eventid), year: toInteger(line.iyear), 
month:toInteger( line.imonth), day:toInteger( line.iday), approxdate: line.approxdate, 
summary: line.summary, latitude: toFloat(line.latitude),longitude: 
toFloat(line.longitude), country: line.country_txt,region: line.region_txt,provstate: 
line.provstate,city: line.city}); 
 
CREATE INDEX ind_eventid FOR (i:Incident) ON (i.eventid); 
CREATE INDEX ind_inc_country FOR (i:Incident) ON (i.country); 
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CREATE INDEX ind_inc_region FOR (i:Incident) ON (i.region); 
CREATE INDEX ind_inc_provstate FOR (i:Incident) ON (i.provstate); 
CREATE INDEX ind_inc_city FOR (i:Incident) ON (i.city); 
 
LOAD CSV FROM "file:///city.csv" AS row 
CREATE (c:City {name: row[0], provstate: row[2], country: row[1], region: row[3]} ); 
 
CREATE INDEX ind_city_name FOR (c:City) ON (c.name); 
 
MATCH (i:Incident) 
MATCH (c:City {name: i.city} ) 
CREATE (c)-[r:INC_CITY]->(i); 
 
LOAD CSV  WITH HEADERS FROM "file:///gtd_incidents.csv" AS row 
WITH row where row.provstate is not null 
WITH toFloat(row.eventid) AS reventid, row.provstate AS rprovstate,  row.country_txt 
AS rcountry, row.region_txt AS rregion 
MATCH (i:Incident{ eventid: reventid}) 
MERGE (p:Provstate {name: rprovstate ,country:COALESCE(rcountry, "") 
,region:COALESCE(rregion, "") }) 
MERGE (p)-[r:INC_PROVSTATE]->(i); 
 
CREATE INDEX ind_provstate_name FOR (p:Provstate) ON (p.name); 
 
LOAD CSV FROM "file:///country.csv" AS row 
CREATE (c:Country {name: row[0], region: row[1]} ); 
 




WHERE i.country is not null 
MATCH (c:Country {name: i.country} ) 
CREATE (c)-[r:INC_COUNTRY]->(i); 
 
LOAD CSV FROM "file:///region.csv" AS row 
CREATE (r:Region {name: row[0]} ); 
 
 
CREATE INDEX ind_region_name FOR (r:Region)ON (r.name); 
 
MATCH (i:Incident) 
WHERE i.region is not null 
MATCH (r:Region {name: i.region} ) 
CREATE (r)-[rel:INC_REGION]->(i); 
 
LOAD CSV  WITH HEADERS FROM "file:///gtd_incidents.csv" AS row 
WITH  row.attacktype1_txt AS attacktype1 
MERGE (a:Attacktype {description: attacktype1} ); 
 
CREATE INDEX ind_attacktype FOR (r:Attacktype)ON (r.description); 
 
LOAD CSV  WITH HEADERS FROM "file:///gtd_incidents.csv" AS row  
WITH row where row.attacktype1_txt is not null 
WITH  toFloat(row.eventid) AS reventid, row.attacktype1_txt AS attacktype1_txt 
MATCH (i:Incident {eventid: reventid }) 
MATCH (a:Attacktype {description: attacktype1_txt }) 
CREATE (a)-[r:ATTACK_USED]->(i); 
 
LOAD CSV  WITH HEADERS FROM "file:///gtd_incidents.csv" AS row  
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WITH row where row.alternative_txt is not null 
WITH  toFloat(row.eventid) AS reventid, row.alternative_txt AS alternative_txt 
MERGE (c:CrimeType {description: alternative_txt }); 
 
CREATE INDEX ind_crime FOR (r:CrimeType)ON (r.description); 
 
LOAD CSV  WITH HEADERS FROM "file:///gtd_incidents.csv" AS row  
WITH row where row.attacktype1_txt is not null 
WITH  toFloat(row.eventid) AS reventid, row.alternative_txt AS alternative_txt 
MATCH (i:Incident {eventid: reventid }) 
MATCH (c:CrimeType {description: alternative_txt }) 
CREATE (c)-[r:CRIME_TYPE]->(i); 
 
LOAD CSV  WITH HEADERS FROM "file:///gtd_incidents.csv" AS row  
WITH  toFloat(row.eventid) AS reventid,row.nkill AS nkill, row.nwoundus AS 
nwoundus, row.property AS property, row.propextent_txt AS propextent_txt, 
row.propvalue AS propvalue, row.ishostkid AS ishostkid,row.nhostkid AS nhostkid 
CREATE (d:Damage {nkill: 
nkill,nwoundus:nwoundus,property:property,propextent_txt:propextent_txt,propvalue:p
ropvalue ,ishostkid:ishostkid, nhostkid:nhostkid, eventid: reventid }); 
 
CREATE INDEX ind_damage_event_id FOR (c:Damage) ON (c.eventid); 
 
MATCH (i:Incident) 
MATCH (d:Damage {eventid:i.eventid}) 
CREATE (i)-[rel:DAMAGE_CAUSED]->(d); 
 
LOAD CSV  WITH HEADERS FROM "file:///gtd_incidents.csv" AS row  
WITH  toFloat(row.eventid) AS reventid,  row.target1 AS rtarget, row.natlty1_txt AS 
targetCountry, row.targtype1 as rtargtype1 
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MATCH (i:Incident {eventid: reventid }) 
CREATE (t:Target { targetid:rtargtype1,  description:COALESCE(rtarget, ""), coun-




WHERE t.country = c.name 
MERGE (t)-[r:TARGET_COUNTRY]->(c); 
 
CREATE INDEX ind_target FOR (r:Target)ON (r.description); 
CREATE INDEX ind_targetid FOR (r:Target)ON (r.targetid); 
 
LOAD CSV  WITH HEADERS FROM "file:///gtd_incidents.csv" AS row  
WITH  row.target1 AS rtarget , row.targtype1_txt AS rtargettype, row.targtype1 As 
rtargettypeid 
MERGE (tt:TargetType {description: rtargettype, targettypeid:rtargettypeid  }); 
              
              
MATCh (t:Target) 
MATCH (tt:TargetType ) 
WHERE t.targetid = tt.targettypeid 
MERGE (tt)-[rel:TARGET_TYPE]->(t); 
 
LOAD CSV  WITH HEADERS FROM "file:///gtd_incidents.csv" AS row  
WITH row where row.targsubtype1_txt is not null 
WITH  row.targsubtype1_txt AS rtargetsubtype, toFloat(row.eventid) AS reventid 
MATCH (i:Incident {eventid: reventid })<-[r:TARGET_INCIDENT]-(t:Target ) 
MERGE (tt:TargetSubtype {description: rtargetsubtype }) 
MERGE (tt)-[rel:TARGETSUBTIPE]->(t); 
 
  -57- 
LOAD CSV  WITH HEADERS FROM "file:///gtd_incidents.csv" AS row  
WITH row where row.corp1 is not null 
WITH  toFloat(row.eventid) AS reventid, row.corp1 AS rcorp1 
MATCH (i:Incident {eventid: reventid })<-[r:TARGET_INCIDENT]-(t:Target ) 
MERGE (c:Corp1 {description: rcorp1 }) 
MERGE (c)-[rel:TARGET_CORP]->(t); 
 
LOAD CSV  WITH HEADERS FROM "file:///gtd_incidents.csv" AS row  
WITH row where row.addnotes is not null 
WITH  toFloat(row.eventid) AS reventid, row.addnotes AS raddnotes 
MATCH (i:Incident {eventid: reventid }) 
MERGE (n:Notes {description: raddnotes }) 
MERGE (i)-[r:INCIDENT_NOTES]->(n); 
 
LOAD CSV  WITH HEADERS FROM "file:///gtd_incidents.csv" AS row  
WITH row where row.scite1 is not null 
WITH  toFloat(row.eventid) AS reventid, row.scite1 AS scite1 
MATCH (i:Incident {eventid: reventid }) 
CREATE (c:Citation {description: scite1 }) 
CREATE (i)-[r:INCIDENT_CITATIONS]->(c); 
 
LOAD CSV  WITH HEADERS FROM "file:///gtd_incidents.csv" AS row  
WITH row where row.scite1 is not null 
WITH  toFloat(row.eventid) AS reventid, row.scite2 AS scite2 
MATCH (i:Incident {eventid: reventid }) 
CREATE (c:Citation {description: scite2 }) 
CREATE (i)-[r:INCIDENT_CITATIONS]->(c); 
 
LOAD CSV  WITH HEADERS FROM "file:///gtd_incidents.csv" AS row  
-58- 
WITH row where row.scite1 is not null 
WITH  toFloat(row.eventid) AS reventid, row.scite3 AS scite3 
MATCH (i:Incident {eventid: reventid }) 
CREATE (c:Citation {description: scite3 }) 
CREATE (i)-[r:INCIDENT_CITATIONS]->(c); 
 
LOAD CSV  WITH HEADERS FROM "file:///gtd_incidents.csv" AS row  
WITH  toFloat(row.eventid) AS reventid, row.weaptype1_txt AS weaptype, 
row.weapdetail As  weapdetail 
MATCH (i:Incident {eventid: reventid }) 
CREATE (w:Weapon {description: weaptype , description: COALESCE(weapdetail, 
"Not specified"), eventid :reventid   }) 
CREATE (w)-[r:WEAPONS_USED]->(i); 
 
CREATE INDEX ind_weapon_inciden_id FOR (w:Weapon) ON (w.eventid); 
 
LOAD CSV  WITH HEADERS FROM "file:///gtd_incidents.csv" AS row  
WITH row where row.weaptype1_txt is not null  
WITH  toFloat(row.eventid) AS reventid, row.weaptype1_txt AS weaptype 
MATCH (w:Weapon {eventid: reventid }) 
MERGE (wt:WeaponType {description: weaptype  }) 
MERGE (wt)-[r:WEAPONTYPE]->(w); 
 
LOAD CSV  WITH HEADERS FROM "file:///gtd_incidents.csv" AS row  
WITH row where row.weapsubtype1_txt is not null 
WITH  toFloat(row.eventid) AS reventid, row.weapsubtype1_txt AS weapsubtype 
MATCH (w:Weapon {eventid: reventid }) 
MERGE (ws:WeaponSubtype {description: weapsubtype  }) 
MERGE (ws)-[r:WEAPONSUBTYPE]->(w); 
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LOAD CSV  WITH HEADERS FROM "file:///gtd_incidents.csv" AS row  
WITH  toFloat(row.eventid) AS reventid, row.gname AS description 
MATCH (i:Incident {eventid: reventid }) 
MERGE (p:Perpetrator {description:description  }) 
MERGE (p)-[r:INCIDENT_PERP]->(i); 
 
CREATE INDEX perp_name FOR (p:Perpetrator) on (p.description ); 
 
LOAD CSV  WITH HEADERS FROM "file:///gtd_incidents.csv" AS row  
WITH row where row.motive is not null 
WITH  toFloat(row.eventid) AS reventid, row.motive AS rdescription 
MATCH (i:Incident {eventid: reventid }) 
MERGE (m:Motive {description: rdescription  }) 
MERGE (m)-[r:INCIDENT_MOTIVE]->(i); 
 
LOAD CSV  WITH HEADERS FROM "file:///gtd_incidents.csv" AS row  
WITH row where row.motive is not null 
WITH  toFloat(row.eventid) AS reventid, row.motive AS motive, row.gname AS pdesc 
MATCH (i:Incident {eventid: reventid }) 
MATCH (m:Motive {description: motive }) 
MATCH (p:Perpetrator  {description: pdesc }) 
MERGE (p)-[rel:PMOTIVE]->(m);  
 
